

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Rohingya Issue

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Abstract: The Rohingya issue is one of the most widely discussed phenomena throughout our country. This crisis has persisted for a long time and may become a long-term problem if it is not managed skillfully. To address the issue effectively, it is essential to understand the underlying motives and dynamics behind it. In this research paper, one of the most significant analytical approaches—*game theory*—is applied to examine the causes of the Rohingya crisis. Based on these motives and interactions, a suitable game-theoretic framework will be identified to determine whether the issue can be modeled as a monopoly, duopoly, zero-sum, or constant-sum game. The analysis aims to derive an optimal solution for this problem, which may assist policymakers in taking informed decisions to resolve the crisis.

Keywords: Rohingya, Optimization, Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Zero-Sum Game

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1. Introduction

This research paper is organized into three major sections.

In the **first section**, the fundamental concepts of *game theory* are discussed, which itself is divided into three subsections. The first subsection explores the **history of game theory**, the second presents **important definitions and theorems**, and the third examines **the rules and principles** that govern games within the framework of game theory.

In the **second section**, the paper discusses the **historical background and context of the Rohingya crisis**.

In the **third section**, the **Rohingya issue** is analyzed through the lens of **game theory** to identify its underlying strategic dynamics. Finally, the paper proposes **potential solutions** to the crisis, also grounded in game-theoretic reasoning.

1.1. History of Game Theory

Game theory is a relatively new branch of mathematics compared to other, more traditional fields. It is believed that the British diplomat **James Waldegrave** first discussed the concept of game theory in 1713, [1] which is considered the earliest known contribution to this field.

In 1913, the German mathematician **Ernst Friedrich Ferdinand Zermelo** also worked on game theory, [2] followed by the French mathematician **Émile Borel**, who made significant progress between 1921 and 1927. [3] Borel developed the **mathematical structure of game**

theory and wrote **four papers** on strategic aspects of games. [4] He also suggested that game theory could be applied to **economic and military** contexts, although his work on these topics remained limited.

About seven years later, the renowned mathematician **John von Neumann** made major advancements that established the **formal foundation** of game theory. For this reason, Neumann is often regarded as the **father of game theory**. Later, Neumann and economist **Oskar Morgenstern** co-authored the seminal book *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, often referred to as the *Bible of Game Theory*. [5] This work helped identify **optimal solutions** for **two-person zero-sum games** and analyzed the **early stages of cooperative games**.

Following this, researchers such as **Shilling, Riker, Taplan, and Raiffa** contributed further to the field, helping game theory gain widespread popularity. By the **1960s**, the application of game theory expanded rapidly. [6]

After Neumann and Morgenstern, the mathematician **John Nash** became one of the most influential figures in the field. He distinguished between **cooperative** and **non-cooperative** games and proposed a key theory for non-cooperative or conflicting situations, stating that “*every conflicting situation has an equilibrium point.*” [7] For this groundbreaking work, he received the **Nobel Prize in 1994**. This theory is known as the **Nash Equilibrium** or **Nash Equilibrium Theory**. [8]

Earlier, in 1838, **Augustin Cournot** (not “Vournot”) studied the **duopoly model**, which was later found to partially align with Nash’s equilibrium concept. Therefore, Cournot’s model is often considered a **restricted version** of the Nash Equilibrium.

Reinhard Selten later refined Nash’s work by introducing the concept of **subgame-perfect equilibrium**,

providing a solution for games with sequential moves. In 1967, John Harsanyi developed the concepts of **complete information** and **Bayesian games**. Meanwhile, John Maynard Smith applied game theory to **biological sciences**, particularly through the concept of **evolutionarily stable strategies**.

By the 1970s, the scope and application of game theory had expanded significantly across disciplines such as **law**, **evolutionary biology**, [9] **computer science**, and **cybersecurity**. [10]

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2. Important Definitions and Theorems of Game Theory

2.1. Definition of Game Theory:

In simple terms, *game theory* refers to the study and analysis of **strategic interactions** among rational decision-makers. [11] It involves describing situations where participants (called *players*) make decisions that are interdependent, meaning the outcome for each participant depends on the actions of others.

Game theory is essentially the **science of strategies**—the process of formulating optimal decisions by observing and anticipating the strategies of others. It aims to determine how individuals or groups can make rational choices to maximize their benefits in either **conflict** or **cooperative** situations. [12]

Importantly, game theory does not always provide a definitive *solution* to every conflict or cooperation scenario. Rather, its main purpose is to provide a **logical and fair framework** for all participants to make optimal decisions. [13]

2.2. Types of Games

2.2.1. Finite and Infinite Games

- A *finite game* has a limited number of players, strategies, and objectives.
- An *infinite game* involves unlimited players, strategies, or goals.
- When multiple players collaborate and act as a single side in a game, it is called a coalition game.

2.2.2. Cooperative and Non-Cooperative (Conflict) Games

A **cooperative game** is one in which players work together to achieve mutual benefits.

A **non-cooperative** or **conflict game** occurs when players compete, trying to maximize their own gains while minimizing those of their opponents.

2.3. Fundamental Principles of Game Theory

1. Every game involves at least **two players or teams** (though there can be more).
2. Each player is a **decision-maker**, responsible for choosing actions that benefit their team.
3. Every player is associated with a **set of possible outcomes**.
4. Each player follows a **strategy**, which is a defined plan of action.
5. Players must have the ability to **adapt their strategies** based on the moves of others.
6. Every player aims to achieve the **maximum possible benefit** and **minimum loss**.
 - According to von Neumann and Morgenstern: “*The best strategy in a game ensures the highest gain with the least possible loss.*”
7. Game outcomes are generally **unpredictable**; if the result is known beforehand, it ceases to qualify as a true “game.”
8. Rational behavior is essential — **each player must act rationally** based on available information.

2.4. Types of Strategic Games

2.4.1. Constant-Sum Game

A two players game will be called constant game if for any constant K , $P_1(x) + P_2(x) = K$ and $X \in X_1 \times X_2$. Generally, the concept of constant sum game is the sum of gaining of a team and the amount of losing of the opponent team will be constant.

2.4.2. Zero-Sum Game

Zero-sum game is a special format of game. Mathematically this game can be expressed as $P_1(x) + P_2(x) = 0$. So, the concept of this game is ‘The amount of gaining of a team will be equal as the amount of losing of the opponent team.’

2.4.3. Adamant Boyish Syndrome

This represents a situation where there is **only one player** who has **multiple strategies** and complete independence in choosing among them.

2.4.4. Robinson Crusoe Syndrome

This is the **opposite** of Adamant Boyish Syndrome. Here, there is **only one player** but **only one** available strategy, leaving no choice. This is also known as the **Robinson Falaise** scenario. [14]

3. Description of the Rohingya Crisis

To understand the crisis involving the Rohingya people and to uncover its real nature, it is essential to examine the **history of the Rohingya’s demography** and their **relationship with the general population of Myanmar**.

It is equally important to trace how this relationship has deteriorated over time, particularly between the Rohingya and the successive rulers of Myanmar.

The region now known as **Rakhine State** was historically called **Arakan**. However, the original inhabitants of the region did not use the name *Arakan*. In ancient times, they referred to their land as *Rokhinge*, which over time evolved into *Arkhang* or *Rokhgong*. [15] These names appear in historical records from Mughal-era writers such as **Abul Fazl**. Muslim poets from Arakan often used the term *Rokhgong*, while others pronounced it as *Rosaong*. This variation likely arose because the Arabic language does not contain a consonant equivalent to the Bengali “kh” sound. In Bengali literature, the entire Arakan region was referred to as *Rosaong*. The people of **Chittagong** later adapted the term *Rosaong* into *Rohang* for easier pronunciation. [15] Over time, *Rohang* evolved into *Rohingya*, the term now familiar to people throughout Bangladesh.

Historically, the **Arakan region** remained an independent kingdom from **2666 B.C. to 1784 A.D.** [16] Inscriptions suggest that after the collapse of the **Dinnawadi Dynasty (A.D. 146–198)**, the **Chanda Dynasty** rose to prominence in Arakan and began territorial expansion in the region. [17]

Historical records indicate that the **first appearance of Muslims in Arakan** dates back to the **eighth century A.D.**, around the same period when Islam began spreading into present-day Bangladesh. According to the *Radjatung* (the chronicle of Arakan), during the reign of **King Mahat-Ingh Chandra (A.D. 788–810)**, a foreign ship wrecked near the island of **Ranbi**. Some Muslim sailors survived the wreck and sought refuge in Arakan, settling in the countryside. This incident is considered the **first recorded presence of Muslims in Arakan**.

Between the **ninth and fourteenth centuries**, the Muslim population of Arakan developed close **commercial and cultural ties** with **Arab traders**. However, these Muslims were culturally distinct from the Bengali Muslims. **Abul Fazl** described them as “*neither Hindu nor Muslim*”, noting that their customs allowed marriage between siblings and other unconventional practices for the time.

By the **fourteenth century**, relations between Muslims and Arakanese people had become more cooperative. Muslim influence increased significantly during the reign of **King Mins Moyan (1403–1434 B.C.)**. [18] Around this time, **Sultan Jalaluddin Shah**, ruler of **Gaur**, recaptured parts of Burma (modern-day Myanmar) with the help of **Buddhist King Naremykholi**, [19] who maintained friendly relations with Muslims and appointed Muslim advisors in his royal court. For approximately two centuries thereafter, **Muslim rulers governed the Arakan kingdom**, and the Muslim population grew rapidly.

However, between **1631 and 1635**, severe famine and mismanagement weakened Muslim rule. In **1660**, the Arakanese King **Thandhothuman** massacred the family of **Mughal Prince Shah Shuja**, who had sought asylum in Arakan. This marked the **beginning of systematic persecution of Muslims** in the region. Later, in **1780**, **King Bodawpaya** of Burma annexed Arakan. A known opponent of Islam, **Bodawpaya** launched brutal campaigns

of **mass killings and religious persecution** against Muslims—acts often regarded as the **second phase of Rohingya oppression**.

The **third phase** of persecution began towards the **end of British colonial rule**. When Burma gained independence from Britain in **1937**, widespread **anti-Muslim riots** were orchestrated by Buddhist nationalists, resulting in the deaths of **over three million Muslims** according to some historical estimates.

By the **mid-20th century**, as British rule neared its end across South Asia, the Rohingya—long subjected to persecution—sought inclusion in **Pakistan**. They even met with **Muhammad Ali Jinnah**, the founder of Pakistan, to express this wish. However, when **India and Pakistan gained independence in 1947**, and **Burma followed in 1948**, their aspirations were left unfulfilled. Due to political manipulation by the British and the short-sightedness of Muslim leaders of the time, the Rohingya failed to join Pakistan.

Their desire to align with Pakistan rather than Burma created **lasting resentment** among the Burmese majority. Since then, both the **ruling class and general population of Myanmar** have viewed the Rohingyas with deep suspicion, labeling them as **illegal immigrants from Bangladesh**. Following independence, Myanmar’s government **denied them citizenship and basic human rights**.

Although Myanmar officially recognized **135 ethnic minorities**, the Rohingya were **excluded** from that list. [20] They were stripped of citizenship, prevented from holding **government jobs, owning property**, or even conducting **bank transactions**. They were barred from receiving **public healthcare, education, and utilities** such as electricity, water, and gas. They could not marry without government permission, and having **more than two children** was treated as a **criminal offense**. Over decades, this systemic deprivation forced the Rohingya population into a **state of humiliation, statelessness, and despair**.

Under various pretexts, the **Myanmar military authorities** have repeatedly carried out **ethnic cleansing operations** against the Rohingya in **Arakan (Rakhine) State**.

- The **first major displacement** occurred in **1978**, when violent military operations forced **hundreds of thousands** of Rohingyas to flee to **Bangladesh**. Although the crisis was treated as temporary and some refugees were later repatriated, the situation became a **chronic humanitarian issue**.
- In **1991**, another wave of violence was unleashed under the **State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)**, supposedly to suppress “Rohingya terrorists.” During this campaign, Rohingyas were **killed, raped, enslaved, and forced into labor**; **mosques were destroyed, and religious practices restricted**. Once again, **hundreds of thousands fled to Bangladesh**.
- Similar atrocities recurred in **2012** and again in **2017**, leading to what the **United Nations** described as a campaign of “**genocide**.” [21]

Today, it is estimated that **around 700,000 Rohingyas** have taken refuge in **Bangladesh**, primarily in the **Cox’s Bazar region**.

4. Bangladesh and Myanmar — A Comparative Analysis of Strength

To understand the ongoing tension between Bangladesh and Myanmar regarding the Rohingya crisis, it is necessary to examine the **political, economic, and military capacities** of both nations. Any misjudgment by either side could cause serious harm to both.

4.1. Economic and Demographic Overview

Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, with about **1,278 people per square kilometer**. [22] Its **poverty rate** remains high—around **30%**, and it ranks **139th** out of **188 countries** on the **Human Development Index (HDI)**. [23] The country has **limited natural resources**, depending mainly on its **textile and garment industry** and **remittances** from migrant workers. Unemployment, including among the educated, remains a major concern.

Myanmar, though not significantly better off socioeconomically, enjoys **several natural and geographical advantages**. Its **population density** is only **82 per square kilometer**, [24] and it is nearly **five times larger** in land area than Bangladesh. Myanmar is rich in **natural gas, coal, gold, silver, copper, iron**, and other valuable minerals. It also earns substantial foreign exchange through **timber exports**.

Myanmar's **foreign trade network** is stronger and more diversified than Bangladesh's. Major import partners include **China (42%), Thailand (18%), Singapore (11%), and Japan (4.8%)**. The same countries are also major export destinations. Myanmar exports for **China (38%), Thailand (26%), Singapore (6%), and Japan (6%)**. [25]

In contrast, Bangladesh's trade is largely **one-sided**—it mainly imports from **China (22%), India (14%), and Singapore (5%)**, while exporting primarily to the **USA (13%), Germany (13%), and the European Union (10%)**. [26] Thus, Myanmar has established **balanced bilateral relationships**, while Bangladesh remains in an **economically dependent position**.

4.2. Military Comparison

- Myanmar ranks 31st in global military strength with 516,000 active soldiers, 249 aircraft, 592 tanks, 1,358 armored vehicles, 996 artillery units, and 108 missile launchers. Its navy has 155 ships, including five frigates. However, because Myanmar has long been under military rule, much of this power has been used internally rather than in defense, reducing its external effectiveness.
- Bangladesh, ranked 57th, has 205,000 military personnel, 166 aircraft, 534 tanks, 942 armored vehicles, 18 artillery units, and 32 missile launchers. Its navy includes 91 ships, with six frigates, four corvettes, and two submarines. The experience of Bangladeshi peacekeepers in

international missions significantly strengthens their strategic capabilities. [27]

Thus, while Myanmar is slightly ahead militarily, Bangladesh enjoys a moral and experiential advantage, supported by its global reputation for peacekeeping and professionalism.

5. The Wrong Journey: A Case of Misreading

Myanmar's military regime continues to persecute the Rohingya population largely **independently**, without significant external influence. They claim the Rohingyas are **illegal immigrants from Bangladesh**, yet have **taken no diplomatic or legal steps** to verify this claim or to coordinate with the Bangladeshi government on repatriation. Instead, Myanmar has **unilaterally decided** to eliminate an entire ethnic group using **illegal military force**.

Myanmar's dictatorship plays what can be called a **"single-player dictatorship game."** Bangladesh initially viewed the issue as **Myanmar's internal matter** and decided **not to intervene** or provide shelter to the Rohingyas. This reflected a **serious strategic miscalculation**.

Bangladesh's **intelligence agencies** also failed to anticipate the impending humanitarian disaster. This oversight demonstrated Bangladesh's **weak situational awareness** as a player in the regional game. Since Myanmar consistently labeled the Rohingyas as **"illegal Bengali infiltrators,"** Bangladesh was inevitably drawn into the issue as a **de facto second player**—a fact it failed to recognize. Consequently, Bangladesh's **passive approach** turned a regional crisis into a national burden, generating internal unrest and humanitarian pressure.

In humanitarian terms, **the right to life and human rights** must always take precedence over other considerations. The unarmed and persecuted Rohingya naturally sought refuge in neighboring Bangladesh. Many entered the country illegally through **organized human traffickers**, and their prolonged suffering made them **vulnerable to radicalization**. Because the Rohingyas are predominantly **Muslim**, public sympathy within Bangladesh was strong, making **Bangladesh's participation inevitable** under popular and moral pressure.

Myanmar's actions effectively pushed Bangladesh into a **"Robinson Crusoe Syndrome"** scenario—where one player is forced to act alone, with no choice but to provide refuge.

From the outset, **Bangladesh's foreign policy mistakes** and **Myanmar's strategic manipulation** led the crisis in the wrong direction. Myanmar has consistently **taken the first move** in every stage of the game—what game theory calls the **"first-mover advantage."** [28] As a result, Myanmar has benefited strategically, while Bangladesh has remained a **passive player**—a position that cannot win any game.

Bangladesh's **misreading of the situation** and **adoption of a one-player, passive strategy** have only driven the country further down the wrong path.

6. Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Rohingya Issue and the Process of Implementation

Myanmar has tried to play this game as a single-player game, but the impact of this game gives the impression of a two-player game. In this case, the main goal of the game is very clear — they want to make it a zero-sum game. The primary objective of Myanmar is to harm Bangladesh and win their game based on Bangladesh's losses.

In such a situation, the main question arises: *Is there any way for Bangladesh to overcome this situation?* The answer is yes — according to game theory, there are several possible ways. When two or more participants or players engage in cooperative or collusive games, we use the concept of **Nash Equilibrium** to bring the situation into a state of balance. [29] The main reason for using Nash Equilibrium is that it ensures there is a stable equilibrium point in every non-cooperative game, and this position remains unchanged unless one of the opponents changes their strategy. According to this theory, Nash Equilibrium is an appropriate concept to apply in such non-cooperative games.

In every game, each player seeks to maximize their own benefit through their chosen strategy. To win, players have the right to change their strategies at any moment, and their opponents have the same opportunities. In non-cooperative games, there is no penalty for changing strategies. Each group of players continuously adjusts their strategies to seize the winning advantage. Therefore, Bangladesh needs to adopt stronger strategies to counter all the possible strategies of Myanmar.

In such cases, the **Prisoner's Dilemma** presents a diplomatic situation in which each group of players may use its best strategy but still fail to achieve the best possible outcome — often resulting in losses for all participants. Although every group may act in its own best interest, the overall outcome becomes harmful to everyone. In this situation, cooperation can only be established if every group respects the logical decisions of others. A single act of irrational or non-cooperative behavior by any group can lead to damage for all parties involved.

Bangladesh wants to resolve the Rohingya crisis while maintaining a good relationship with Myanmar. [30] At the same time, it seeks a solution through international cooperation. However, such a dual desire can be considered reckless for Bangladesh. In this strategic game, Myanmar is playing with tactics that appear unprofessional, giving the impression that it is a non-serious player. In this situation, there is no simple way to compel Myanmar to make rational decisions in place of its reckless strategies. Therefore, Myanmar must be pressured to adopt logical and responsible choices.

Two concepts—**expectation** and **threat**—can be applied to Myanmar in this collision of interests.³¹ For Bangladesh, these are the most effective strategies to pursue in order to achieve a favorable outcome. However, to use these strategies effectively, Bangladesh must change its mindset and participate in the game as an active player rather than a passive one.

Bangladesh should attempt to transform this **zero-sum game** into a **constant-sum game**. A constant-sum game is

one in which winning does not necessarily require harming the other player. In this game, both players can either win or lose. Constant-sum games are of two types: **positive** and **negative**. If both players win, it is a positive constant-sum game; if both lose, it is a negative constant-sum game. Of the two strategies Bangladesh must adopt, expectation can lead to a positive outcome, while threat could push the situation toward a negative outcome.

History shows that oppressed and stateless ethnic groups often take extraordinary measures for survival. They can transform impossibilities into reality. If the persecution of the Rohingya people continues, two possible outcomes must be considered.

First, the Rohingya could organize themselves as an ethnic force and wage war in the Arakan region, potentially causing Myanmar to lose authority over part of its territory. In fact, many Rohingya groups have already emerged in opposition to Myanmar's oppressive rule, such as the Arakan Liberation Party, Mujahid Party, Rohingya Patriotic Front, Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front, Rohingya Solidarity Organization, and Arakan Rohingya National Organization. If the Myanmar government does not stop the violence, these groups may unite, launch a stronger movement, or even push for independence. Such an outcome would mean Myanmar risks losing a state—a significant loss to its sovereignty. Bangladesh must convey this message firmly to Myanmar.

Bangladesh's constitution also obliges it to assist oppressed peoples like the Rohingya. **Paragraph 25** of the constitution emphasizes respect for national sovereignty, equality, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts under the principles of international law and the United Nations. It specifically calls for:

- (a) Avoiding the use of force and promoting complete disarmament in international relations.
- (b) Supporting nations in their pursuit of independence, with political, economic, and social assistance.
- (c) Extending justified support to oppressed peoples against imperialism, colonialism, and apartheid.

Secondly, the Rohingya might resort to disorganized national or international activities linked to militancy and destruction as a means of survival. This would pose a grave threat not only to the region but also to international peace. Being the closest neighbor, Bangladesh would be directly affected in both possible scenarios. Thus, if unchecked, the crisis could turn into a **negative zero-sum game** for both Bangladesh and Myanmar.

The key to success in this game lies in international relations. In such a conflict, both Bangladesh and Myanmar will try to win over other nations by adjusting their internal strategies. From the beginning, Myanmar has used religion as its primary strategy—labeling Rohingya as illegal Bengali Muslims and militants. This has been an effective narrative, enabling Myanmar to secure support from neighboring countries. Russia and China openly back Myanmar, while India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan remain silent, which indirectly benefits Myanmar. No Islamic country has taken a firm stand against Myanmar, since it successfully framed the crisis as a religious and security issue.

Bangladesh, on the other hand, suffers from weaknesses in international relations. It has no strong Islamic allies nearby, and relations with many Muslim countries are not

influential enough to sway Myanmar. Moreover, Russia, China, and India have their own biases against Muslims, which further weakens Bangladesh's position. Consequently, Bangladesh stands isolated on this issue.

Myanmar is more advanced than Bangladesh in managing international relations. With cultural and religious influence, it enjoys stronger support from neighboring countries. For Bangladesh, relying on distant Muslim countries is not strategically effective, as Myanmar has little interaction with them. Instead, India and China hold the most significant roles. However, both maintain close ties with Myanmar, leaving Bangladesh in a difficult position. Therefore, Bangladesh must pursue international diplomacy with greater skill, care, and persistence.

Since most of Bangladesh's neighbors either directly or indirectly support Myanmar, Bangladesh must adopt new strategies. In building international relationships, **game theory** can be especially useful in identifying true allies. Friendship in international politics cannot be one-sided or permanent; it must withstand the tests of mutual interest. Game theory provides a framework for distinguishing friends from adversaries.

Table 1. Friendship Matrix

		X	
		Friend (+)	Enemy (-)
Y	Friend (+)	Friend (+)	Enemy (-)
	Enemy (-)	Enemy (-)	Friend (+)

When selecting allies, it is crucial to remember that players unwilling or unable to participate effectively in the game are not reliable friends. Currently, China is Myanmar's most powerful ally. However, Bangladesh also maintains ties with China. Bangladesh would achieve a major diplomatic victory if it could persuade China to stop supporting Myanmar or at least remain neutral on the Rohingya issue.

Bangladesh has historically had strong ties with India, yet India has not openly supported Bangladesh on the Rohingya crisis. This is a frustrating situation for Bangladesh, but it highlights the urgent need to overcome political weaknesses. Securing India's support is essential for the well-being of both countries, and Bangladesh cannot afford to ignore this truth.

India, China, and other influential neighboring countries have directly refrained from taking Bangladesh's side. Given this situation, Bangladesh needs to develop new strategies to move forward. It must invite other nations to stand up for humanity. For those countries already supporting Myanmar, Bangladesh should engage with their internal human rights and social organizations, exerting diplomatic and moral pressure to encourage them to take a humanitarian stance.

Bangladesh can transform this issue into a large cooperative (coalition) game by involving communities, institutions, and various national and international human rights organizations. The human rights organizations of India and China should also be included in this effort. Additionally, poets, writers, teachers, and other intellectuals from these countries need to be made aware of the issue. These individuals and organizations can create internal pressure on their respective governments,

urging them to make decisions based on humanitarian grounds. Even organizations operating within Myanmar should be pressured to address this issue and be included in this cooperative effort.

A strong example can be found in Bangladesh itself. Initially, when the government refused to shelter the Rohingya people, the citizens of Bangladesh became outraged. Consequently, the government was compelled to change its decision and offer refuge to the Rohingyas. Various political and cultural communities played an important role in awakening public sympathy toward the Rohingya people. A similar strategy can be applied to Myanmar and its neighboring countries to evoke compassion for the Rohingya population. If such empathy can be cultivated among neighboring states and within Myanmar's own human rights organizations, it will become much easier to put effective pressure on the Myanmar government. Bangladesh must take the lead in guiding this initiative among other nations and communities.

From the very beginning, Myanmar has labeled the Rohingya people as illegal Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh. In response, Bangladesh has referred to them as persecuted Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar. The people of Bangladesh, irrespective of religion, have viewed this issue through a humanitarian lens that transcends religious boundaries. Since the majority of Myanmar's population follows Buddhism, the Buddhist community in Bangladesh could play a positive role by urging Myanmar to stop persecuting the Rohingya. Such an initiative from Bangladeshi Buddhists would be a remarkable humanitarian gesture.

The Rohingya crisis originated in Myanmar, but it poses a serious threat to the stability of the entire region and could escalate into an international issue. Therefore, Bangladesh must ensure that this matter receives global attention.

Bangladesh faced two options — either to shelter the Rohingya or to refuse them entry. Prioritizing humanity and responding to internal public pressure, Bangladesh decided to provide refuge to the Rohingya population. Similarly, Myanmar now faces two choices — cooperation or non-cooperation.

If Myanmar chooses the path of non-cooperation and continues persecuting the Rohingya, the situation will remain unstable across the region and threaten both regional and international peace. It may even jeopardize Myanmar's sovereignty. If Myanmar refuses to repatriate the Rohingya refugees currently in Bangladesh, this ongoing crisis could push the displaced population toward desperation, making them vulnerable to unethical or extremist activities. Such developments would undoubtedly create regional and global instability, for which Myanmar must bear responsibility. Continued persecution of the Rohingya could ultimately escalate into genocide, leading Myanmar to face international political and legal consequences.

It is therefore urgent to take action against Myanmar for its violations of international human rights norms. Bangladesh can play a pioneering role by raising the issue in international forums and filing complaints against Myanmar for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.

If Myanmar takes positive steps—such as granting

citizenship and dignity to the Rohingya and ending all persecution—the international balance of peace will remain intact.

Table 2. Decision Matrix

Bangladesh	Myanmar		
		Co-operation	Non-co-operation
	Co-operation	X_2Y_2	X_4Y_1
	Non-co-operation	X_1Y_4	X_3Y_3

Bangladesh: $X_1 > X_2 > X_3 > X_4$

Myanmar: $Y_1 > Y_2 > Y_3 > Y_4$

In the modern era, any form of conflict should be avoided, as war brings only destruction. Moreover, peace achieved through war is never permanent and often leads to further instability.

7. Conclusion

There is no lasting solution to the Rohingya crisis except by transforming this competitive and conflicting game into a cooperative one. For such a transformation, both parties must engage in cooperation with well-thought-out strategies.

Bangladesh stands at a more vulnerable position in this game; hence, adopting the best possible strategic approach is crucial. It is expected that Myanmar will change its behavior toward the Rohingya population. Otherwise, it too will face threats and consequences from Bangladesh and the international community.

The ultimate goal should be achieving **national, regional, and international peace and stability** between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Alongside peace, cooperation can also foster stronger **cultural, economic, religious, and political ties**. Conversely, if hostility continues, these very aspects—peace, stability, and independence—will be severely damaged, potentially leading Myanmar to face **international trials and condemnation**.

The **Nash Equilibrium** of this game will occur when both countries engage in mutual dialogue and cooperation, working together toward a peaceful resolution.

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